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Abstract 
It is widely believed that the semantic contents of some linguistic and mental 
representations are determined by factors independent of a person’s bodily makeup. 
Arguments derived from Hilary Putnam’s seminal Twin Earth thought experiment 
have been especially influential in establishing that belief. I claim that there is a 
neglected version of the mind-body relation which undermines those arguments and 
also excludes the possibility of zombies. It has been neglected because it is 
counterintuitive but I show that it can nonetheless be intelligibly worked out in 
detail and all obvious objections met. This suggests that we may be faced with a 
choice between embracing a counterintuitive interpretation of the mind-body 
relation or accepting that a currently very promising theory in cognitive science, 
Prediction Error Minimization, faces a fundamental problem. Furthermore, 
blocking that threat entails that any physicalist/materialst theory of mind is freed 
from the spectre of zombie worlds. The proposal also makes the ideas of personal 
teleportation of mind uploading more plausible. 
 
1. Against Semantic Internalism 
 
Analytic philosophy took a Hegelian turn in the late 20th century, as Tyler Burge 
acknowledged, seeing Ludwig Wittgenstein as its harbinger. Burge contrasted modern 
semantic externalism with the  ‘elderly Cartesian tradition’ that put ‘the spotlight on what 
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exists or transpires “in” the individual – his secret cogitations, his innate cognitive structures, 
his private perceptions and introspections, his grasping of ideas, concepts or forms (1979, 
p.73).  Burge contrasted this Cartesian ‘individualistic’ perspective with the ‘Hegelian 
preoccupation with the role of social institutions in shaping the individual and the contents of 
his thought’ (ibid.). Though discussion of the role of social institutions had been present in the 
analytic tradition’s study of language and mind, what abruptly precipitated the Hegelian turn 
was the introduction of ‘Twin Earth’ thought experiments by Hilary Putnam (1975, p. 139ff.) 
and their further development by Burge. It is these arguments which have been most 
influential in establishing the widespread rejection of an unqualified semantic internalism in 
current analytic philosophy. Internalism does not deny a role to social interaction in the 
development of minds and language, but insists that the neural structures which are normally 
forged during evolutionary and social processes are autonomous in a sense which I shall 
explain shortly.  
The internalist-externalist dichotomy in views about mentality can be couched in terms 
of the representational view of mind which is common in contemporary cognitive science. 
That will provide a useful framework for explanation. The representational view has enough 
currency for what follows to be worthy of attention and even if a different framework for the 
science of mind is adopted that may also be adaptable to the purpose in hand. Briefly, the 
representational view holds that mentally-driven behaviours are causally mediated by objects 
which bear semantic content. Explaining the behaviour of a creature requires the attribution of 
contents which specify the ways in which the environment and internal states of that creature 
are represented. The objects which function as mental representations, the vehicles of content, 
have traditionally been thought to be cerebral though that is disputed by advocates of the so-
called extended mind idea, of which more later.  
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The question then is whether the semantic content of some mental representations is 
determined extra-cerebrally. The question is brought into sharp relief by the idea of Donald 
Davidson’s Swampman (1987, pp. 443-4) or, better, what has come to be known in 
cosmological circles as a Boltzmann brain and may be more perspicuously dubbed an 
accidental cerebral episode (ACE). An ACE is an object which is isomorphic to a normal 
brain for a duration of at least a substantial fraction of a second (it is an atom-for-atom 
duplicate). It pops into existence by so-called quantum accident and is sustained by what 
Bertrand Russell would have called ‘a climax of improbability’ (1954, p. 33). Do all the 
structures and processes in an ACE which are isomorphic to the corresponding items that are 
representations in a normal brain bear the same semantic content as the normal 
representations? Externalists say ‘no’. 
An intuition apparently supporting externalism was well expressed by Putnam (1981, 
pp. 1-4). Imagine an ant crawling on sand which, by chance, happens to trace ‘a recognizable 
caricature of Winston Churchill’ (the tracing of Alfred Hitchcock’s silhouette is brought to 
mind). We can agree that the mark in sand does not represent Churchill, it is a meaningless 
scrawl. Now imagine aliens on a treeless planet where a sheet of paper just happens to drop 
from the sky which seems to be a picture of a tree but is in fact ‘the accidental result of some 
spilled paints’ (ibid., p. 4). If one of those aliens looks at the sheet and forms a mental image, 
is it an image of a tree? It can seem obvious that it is not. If a brain comes to contain 
something which is just like a representation of a tree but which has no causal connection 
with trees how can it be a representation of a tree? 
However, it is not immediately clear that this argument is enough to make the 
externalist case. The argument points towards the claim that objects in an ACE cannot be 
representations of trees because, like that alien’s mental image, they have no causal 
connection with trees. But the internalist can attempt to counter with the concept of 
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‘plugability’. Take a normal person whose actions and speech suggest that s/he hosts mental 
content about trees. And take an ACE which is isomorphic to that person’s brain. Now 
substitute the ACE for the normal brain, preserving all the right connections. The ACE will no 
longer need a climax of improbability for its continued existence as it has become normally 
embodied. We can suppose that the post-operative person will behave and speak in exactly the 
same way as the original. The internalist might claim that this is enough to show that the 
ACE’s representations bear the same content as those of the original brain. What is important 
in thinking about trees is to have the internal causal structure which allows a person to interact 
successfully with trees as trees and apparently talk intelligibly about trees. After all, the 
internalist may argue, the very idea of mental content is a hypothesis aimed at explaining 
behaviours. The behaviours of a normal person and of that person when their brain has been 
replaced by the remnants of an ACE will be, presumably, isomorphic. So why should mental 
contents not be assigned to the person into whose body the ACE is grafted if those contents 
would be assigned to the normal person? 
But Putnam initiated a series of arguments which pushed the externalist case further 
than those reflections on ants and trees. These are the Twin Earth arguments which derive 
from his seminal paper. They have presented a challenge to semantic internalism which has 
not yet effectively been met by general agreement. Details aside, Putnam’s central idea is that 
if two physically isomorphic doppelgangers were to exist in physically anisomorphic 
environments there could be differences in the semantic content of some of the mental 
representations of the environments by the doppelgangers. My aim is to counter that idea 
more effectively than has been done to date. 
Putnam’s battle cry was ‘Cut the pie any way you like, “meanings” just ain’t in the 
head!’ (1975, p. 144). By way of preparation for meeting that challenge in a novel way I shall 
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begin by considering an argument from contemporary cognitive science which supports the 
idea that minds are in heads. 
 
2. Contemporary Mind-Brain ‘Identity’ 
 
Ideas about brain function and computation have proceeded apace in recent years and in the 
wake of those developments Jakob Hohwy has recently defended the idea that minds are 
indeed in heads (2014). Hohwy’s argument is based on an analysis of brain function known as 
Prediction Error Minimization (PEM) (2013). Whilst not attempting to address Twin Earth 
arguments Hohwy does refer to them, writing ‘To me, it seems that PEM is exactly the kind 
of view targeted by the earlier metaphysical debate’ (2014, p. 24, note 8).  
It is easy to see why that should seem so. PEM is a representational theory of mind. It 
involves an inferential mechanism where content-bearing representations are in causal 
interaction. The nature of the causal interaction depends on the contents, so if the contents are 
not wholly determined within the mechanism itself it cannot function as an inferential engine. 
And Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment, which was at the core of that ‘earlier 
metaphysical debate’ implies that some contents cannot be fully determined within a PEM 
mechanism. 
Before coming to Putnam’s famous example, first consider a modified version of his 
challenge. It is currently unknown whether electrons have a substructure or not but suppose 
that early in the Big Bang two kinds of electron were produced, one comprising five particles 
and the other seven. Call them pentacles and septacles. The two kinds were created in separate 
regions of the universe which have now expanded to become much larger than our local 
galactic clusters and conditions have nowhere been extreme enough for electrons’ sub-
structure to be revealed. That being so, it seems obvious that electrons in our local 
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environment must now, unbeknown to us, be either pentacles or septacles. Suppose that they 
are pentacles. 
Now imagine that there is a far-off region of the universe which is exactly like ours in 
every way, it is physically isomorphic, except that the electrons are septacles. We have 
doppelgangers in that world, the only difference between us being that the electrons in their 
bodies are septacles, not pentacles. But it is implausible that that hypothetical sub-structure of 
electrons could have a causal role in our neural mechanism. It is much more plausible that the 
mechanism operates at the intercellular and molecular levels. So our mental mechanisms and 
those of our doppelgangers are type-identical. And yet when we think about the particles in 
cathode ray tube beams we think about pentacles and when they think likewise of old-
fashioned television screens they think about septacles. To deny that is like denying that water 
was H2O back in 1750, before anyone knew about molecular constitutions, that’s Putnam’s 
point. And if quibbles about fuzzy water concepts are set aside and Putnam’s point is well-
taken the implication is that PEM requires that electrons in our environment cannot be either 
pentacles or septacles given the supposition that we have doppelgangers in distinct regions of 
the universe where electrons exist in those two varieties. Because if our electrons were either 
pentacles or septacles we and our doppelgangers would entertain different mental contents 
when thinking about electrons so semantic internalism would be false. 
What is at issue here is not a matter of indexicality, as Burge made clear when he wrote: 
 
[D]e re belief attributions are fundamentally predicational. They consist 
in applying or relating an incompletely interpreted content-clause, an 
open sentence, to an object or sequence of objects, which in effect 
completes the interpretation. What objects these open sentences apply 
to may vary with context. But, according to the picture, it remains 
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possible to divide off contextual or environmental elements represented 
in the propositional attitude attributions from more specifically 
mentalistic elements. 
(1982, p. 98) 
 
Given the electron hypothesis, an utterance of ‘that electron is a pentacle’ can be understood 
as ‘there is something x, and x is a pentacle’. Burge’s thought implies that if there are two 
doppelgangers, one pointing to a pentacle and the other pointing to a septacle there is no need 
to assign different mental contents to them simply because they index different objects. The 
numerical difference between the objects is in the environment, not the minds of the subjects, 
because indexing an object simply involves assigning a value to the mental equivalent of a 
free variable. 
This clarifies what is involved in Putnam’s challenge. Given the story about electrons 
and our doppelgangers, the implication of the semantic internalism involved in PEM is not 
that electrons in our environment are either pentacles or septacles but we do not yet know 
which. It is rather that electrons in our environment cannot be either pentacles or septacles. 
Semantic internalism requires that the meaning of our term ‘electron’ is not in any way 
determined by undiscovered features of the constitution of electrons. And as with linguistic 
representations, so with mental representations. PEM cannot function with mental 
representations of electrons if the content of those representations is not determined within the 
representational mechanism itself.  The content cannot be determined by an as yet undetected 
aspect of the environment. How is that to be reconciled with our intuition that if water is H2O 
now then it must also have been H2O even when nobody on Earth had detected its molecular 
constitution? Before resolving that problem it will be useful to get clear about a debate to do 
with PEM to which Hohwy devotes much discussion (2014: p. 10ff.). 
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3. A Mind’s Extent 
 
In Hohwy (2014) an important concern is to counter an idea dubbed ‘the extended mind’, 
Clark and Chalmers (1998). Andy Clark (2016) has since further defended the extended mind 
idea against Hohwy (2014), arguing that it is compatible with PEM, so that debate is currently 
ongoing and it will be useful to see how a resolution is not required in order to defend PEM 
against Putnam’s challenge.  
PEM is a theory which involves content-bearing mental representations. Hohwy defends 
the idea that those representations are neural and he sees the boundary which encloses them as 
the dorsal horn of the spinal chord (2014, p. 18). The extended mind thesis is that mental 
representations can be wholly or partly constituted by extra-neural objects. The argument is 
not about how the contents of the representations are determined but about the nature of the 
representations themselves. 
Clark argues that part of the computational mechanism of PEM may be outside the 
central nervous system and even outside the body. Environmental objects can partly or wholly 
constitute content-bearing mental representations and an organism’s interaction with its local 
environment can constitute part of the inferential mechanism. It is important to note that this 
supposed extension of the mind into the environment is local. It is only in so far as an 
organism can causally interact with the environment that its mind extends into it. That is 
different from semantic externalism which posits that it is the very constitution of the 
environment which can determine mental contents. If water is H2O then that is so both here on 
Earth and on a planet in a distant galaxy. 
The contrast between Hohwy’s neurocentrism and Clark’s extended mind can be 
thought of as like a spider and its web. Hohwy claims that the mind is wholly contained 
within the neural spider whilst Clark contends that it extends into the web of causal 
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interactions between the spider and its local environment. But Putnam’s challenge to PEM is 
independent of this debate which is just about the local compass of a mind’s extent. He 
declared that meanings ‘ain’t in the head’ but that could just as well be ‘ain’t in the web’. 
There is a wide world beyond the web. 
As Hohwy puts it: 
 
It is thus a requirement on any PEM-based account that it allows, and is 
in principle able to describe, the boundary relative to which prediction 
error is being minimized, from behind which the mind tries to infer the 
hidden causes on the other side. Failing that, there will be no evidence 
for the existence of the agent in question. 
(2014, p. 7) 
 
What is going to be important in meeting Putnam’s challenge to PEM is to argue that there is 
no good reason to think that the contents of mental representations are not wholly determined 
within the boundary behind which an agent is confined. And central to that argument is going 
to be how we think about the mentality of physically isomorphic agents in environments 
which are anisomorphic beyond the boundary. Whether those agents are matched at the level 
of the central nervous system alone or are taken to include the local environment with which 
it interacts is an irrelevant detail and so, for the sake of simplicity, I shall assume 
neurocentrism in what follows. But before tackling Putnam’s idea it will be helpful to 
consider a related issue which poses a different challenge to PEM.  
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4. The Challenge of Consciousness 
 
There has been much work on what have come to be known as the neural correlates of 
consciousness (NCCs). In discussing that work, Hohwy and Tim Bayne identify two distinct 
types of correlation and what they call the ‘NCC project’, going on to write: 
 
In many ways it would be preferable to describe this project in terms of 
the search for the neural substrates or basis of consciousness, but in our 
view the NCC terminology is now so deeply entrenched that any 
attempt to displace it is bound to fail. 
(2015, page in book needed) 
 
What motivates their use of the italicized terms is this:  
 
the disagreement about the metaphysics of consciousness has little 
direct bearing on the NCC project, for all that the project requires is that 
certain neural states ‘underlie’ consciousness, either by way of identity, 
constitution or mere supervenience    
(ibid., page in book needed) 
 
They then go on to write: 
 
 
Neural activity seems capable of explaining only structure and function, 
but consciousness appears to have qualitative properties that are not 
purely structural and functional. Neurally-based explanations appear 
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doomed to leave the ‘what it’s likeness’ of conscious experience 
unexplained. 
The force of this worry is much disputed. … We will not take a 
position in this debate here, but will note that even if there are good 
reasons for thinking that certain aspects of consciousness are purely 
qualitative (and thus beyond the reach of neurally-based explanation), 
there may be other, interesting aspects of consciousness that are 
structural and functional. 
(ibid., page in book needed) 
 
 
In sum, Hohwy and Bayne recognize that there may be a fundamental problem for the NCC 
project but do not wish to let that get in the way of much interesting work which can be done 
without facing that problem. Hohwy’s attitude to PEM relative to the problem posed by 
Putnam seems to be much the same. I shall be arguing that there need be no background 
worries of this sort for cognitive science because both problems can be resolved in one fell 
swoop. 
The problem which ‘what it’s likeness’ may pose for the NCC project can be captured 
in the idea of a ‘zombie’, which has prompted much discussion, as is well described in Kirk 
(2015). The idea can be put like this. I have no doubt that there is something it is like to be 
me, now. But it can seem conceivable and perhaps possible that there exists a distant region of 
the universe which is physically isomorphic to this region and in that other region I have an 
exact doppelganger which behaves exactly as I do but which lacks an ‘inner life’. There is 
something it’s like to be me but nothing it’s like to be my doppelganger. The force of the 
zombie idea is, as Hohwy and Bayne write, ‘much disputed’, but if that force is real the 
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implication is clearly that the NCC project cannot succeed because there must be something 
more to being conscious than just having some neuro-functional structure. 
Clearly there is a link between the concept of a zombie and Putnam’s Twin Earth 
thought experiment. They both involve the idea of physically isomorphic doppelgangers. And 
both arguments share a ubiquitous assumption about the relation between the minds and the 
doppelgangers. It is that for each doppelganger there is a mind. It is not disputed that a zombie 
has a mind; its behaviour is exactly the same as its doppelganger’s so mental contents can be 
attributed to both to explain those behaviours. The suggestion is that a zombie’s mind is 
wholly unconscious; that there is nothing it’s like to be a zombie. 
For Putnam’s doppelgangers on Earth and Twin Earth it is not their consciousness 
which is in question but rather an aspect of their mental content. Putnam suggests that the 
mental contents of the doppelgangers can be different if there is a difference in their 
environment and clearly the mental contents can only be different if the doppelgangers have 
numerically distinct minds. But although it is intuitively appealing to associate an individual 
mind with an individual doppelganger, it may not be necessary. It may be that physically 
isomorphic doppelgangers do not have numerically distinct minds; they share a single mind. 
The idea was first explicitly expressed, so far as I know, by Gottfried Leibniz when he 
wrote. ‘what is to prevent us from saying that these two persons who are at the same time in 
these two similar but inexpressibly distant spheres, are not one and the same person?’ (1704, 
Bk.II, Ch.xxvii, 245). He is here considering two vastly separated isomorphic regions of the 
universe. An earlier hint is when Thomas Aquinas states that angels cannot be qualitatively 
identical and numerically distinct ‘just as it would be impossible for there to be several 
whitenesses apart, or several humanities’ (1274, Bk.I, Question 50, Article 4). More recently, 
Arnold Zuboff has considered the idea (1974, p. 374; 1991, pp. 41-2) and Nick Bostrom 
briefly discusses and dismisses it, of which more later (2006, pp. 186-88). 
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From a semantic internalist and neurocentric point of view the idea is that the brains of 
isomorphic doppelgangers are loci of instances of a particular neuro-functional type and it is 
that instanced type itself which is to be associated with the mind of a single subject, not its 
instances. I use the term ‘associated’ to leave open exactly how the relation between a mind 
and an instanced neuro-functional type is to be construed, whether ‘by way of identity, 
constitution or mere supervenience’, to use Hohwy’s and Bayne’s expression. 
To be clear, what is being suggested is that if there were to exist multiple isomorphic 
doppelgangers, the minds present ought not to be counted along with doppelgangers. The 
number of minds present is equal to the number of particular neuro-functional types of 
structure present, which is 1. It follows that the possibility that a pair of doppelgangers should 
exist, both of which behave as if they had minds but only one of which is conscious does not 
arise. This  ‘unitary interpretation of mind’ definitely excludes the possibility of zombies. 
To be sure, if it could somehow be established in a compelling way that the existence of 
zombies really is relevantly possible then that would scupper the proposal. But as things stand 
there is no general agreement that zombies are possible. And if they are not possible the 
reason may be exactly that that is because atom-for-atom duplicates ought not be imagined as 
having numerically distinct minds. But can matched doppelgangers really be interpreted as 
sharing a single mind? I shall show that they can by applying the idea to Putnam’s seminal 
thought experiment. 
 
5. Set and Object 
 
We have Oscar on Earth and Toscar on Twin Earth. And Putnam’s argument has full force, as 
he acknowledges, when Oscar and Toscar are taken to be physically isomorphic 
doppelgangers (1975, p. 144). But if we are to adopt the alternative unitary interpretation of 
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mind then Oscar and Toscar are to be thought of not as people but as bodies which include 
two instances of a single mind. We have two instances of a particular complex neuro-
functional type of structure ‘in the head’. Let that one mind be the mind of Scar. Scar’s mind 
has two instances, O and T, which are the relevant matched structures in the doppelgangers’ 
heads. Scar’s single mind spans two matched planets; there is an important difference 
between Putnam’s Earth and Twin Earth but that can be set aside for the moment. And, 
practically speaking, we would not expect two planets to be matched unless their local cosmic 
environments were matched too. I shall say more about this later and in the meantime speak 
of ‘parallel worlds’. 
Imagine Scar faced with a green apple. He says ‘I see a green apple before me’. Scar’s 
single utterance is manifest as matched sonic emissions from the doppelgangers. If what he 
says is charitably interpreted as being true, what can the apple which Scar sees be? It cannot 
be the aggregate of the two matched ‘parallel counterpart’ apples since Scar tells us that his 
apple has a mass of a hundred grams and the aggregate of the matched apples has a mass 
which is twice that. Also, an apple cannot have apples as proper parts. 
We are free to interpret Scar’s apple as the set of the two parallel counterpart apples. 
Sets are normally thought of as abstract objects but concrete sets are feasible. This builds on a 
suggestion by Willard Van Orman Quine that an object such as an apple could be interpreted 
as a set which takes itself as sole element: 
 
none of the utility of class theory is impaired by counting an individual, 
its unit class, the class of that unit class, and so on, as one and the same 
thing. 
(1969, p. 31) 
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This suggestion is not generally regarded of being of any use to set theory, but there appears 
to be no telling objection to Quine’s reconstrual of an individual as a set taking itself as sole 
element, which simply breaches the axiom of foundation, Forster (2006, p. 228). The apple 
Scar is faced with can be interpreted as the set of the two parallel counterpart apples, each of 
which is what logicians call a Quine atom, a self-membered singleton set. Interpreting 
individuals as Quine atoms makes an absolute distinction between mereology and set theory 
so, sad to say, David Lewis’s ‘Main Thesis’ that ‘the parts of a class are all and only its 
subclasses’ must be rejected (1991, p. 7). Scar’s apple’s parts include its pips and peel, its 
subsets are the parallel counterpart apples since they are themselves sets. 
Scar is faced with a doubleton apple, a set with two elements. And he reports that his 
apple is green. We can make sense of this if we suppose that he sees the apple as green 
because both its elements are green. That makes sense because if either one of the parallel 
worlds were zapped out of existence the only difference to Scar’s mind would be that it would 
then have just one instance rather than two and Scar would be faced with the remaining green 
apple. Scar plucks his doubleton apple from a doubleton tree and munches it. His munching is 
manifest as matched mandibular motions. 
Now comes the twist. There is a hidden difference between the parallel worlds. We are 
back in a time before chemists had discovered the molecular constitution of the colourless 
liquid raining regularly from above. Scar is oblivious to the fact that in one world it’s raining 
H2O and in the other it’s raining XYZ. Miraculously, this difference between the worlds has 
left them parallel in every other relevant way and we put the consequent anisomorphism 
between O and T down to philosophico-poetic license; the fact that O contains H2O and T 
contains XYZ is to be supposed not to have cognitive consequences, as with the difference 
between pentacles and septacles. 
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Scar quaffs a glass of the stuff. It is a doubleton glass of liquid constituted by doubleton 
molecules. But a doubleton molecule of the stuff Scar quaffs has one element which is H2O 
and the other which is XYZ. However, this difference is hidden from Scar and we are free to 
suppose that an object in his environment has a definite physical property if and only if all its 
elements have that property in common, like that green apple. In which case Scar’s clear 
liquid has indefinite molecular constitution; it is neither H2O nor XYZ, even though it is 
limpid and thirst-quenching. 
Then Scar takes up chemistry. The moment arrives when he at last performs the crucial 
test on a sample of what he calls water and, hey presto! Scar undergoes personal fission into 
Oscar who comes to believe that the sample is H2O and Toscar who comes to believe that it is 
XYZ. What has happened is this. As the doppelgangers move in concert whilst Scar performs 
the experiment, O and T, the two neuro-functional instances of Scar’s mind, become subject 
to different stimuli leading to differing cognitive phenomena and so qualitatively different 
minds. 
Personal fission has been a subject of much debate but it is not obviously unintelligible 
so does not, as things stand, provide a reason to reject this internalist interpretation of 
Putnam’s setup. Ted Sider has provided a metaphysics of transtemporal identity which is well 
adapted to describing the relationship between identity and fission (2001, p. 201). Since 
Sider’s stage theory has not so far met with a killing objection and remains part of 
contemporary metaphysicians’ toolbox, it is legitimate to use it in describing what happens to 
Scar when he probes the molecular constitution of that infamous clear liquid. 
According to stage theory, Scar has two ‘future counterparts’, Oscar and Toscar, to 
whom he bears the relation will be. Scar is neither Oscar nor Toscar but will be each of them, 
though he does not bear the relation will be to the pair, Oscar and Toscar. Scar will not 
become two people. And Scar is a ‘past counterpart’ of both Oscar and Toscar, two distinct 
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people each of whom bears the relation was to Scar. To be sure, stage theory has the odd 
implication that many people have worked at writing this very sentence, but that is arguably 
not intolerably odd since all those people are persons who I, now, was. 
On this analysis Putnam’s original Twin Earth challenge to semantic internalism 
evaporates. Prior to the molecular investigation Oscar and Toscar simply do not exist as 
people with numerically distinct minds. Back then there was just Scar for whom what he 
called ‘water’ had no determinate molecular constitution because its doubleton molecules had 
one element which was H2O and one which was XYZ. However, this liberation from 
Putnam’s challenge to semantic internalism and from zombies arises out of an idea which 
many may find very hard to accept and which can have some bizarre consequences which I 
shall explore below.  
 
6. Back to Reality 
 
So, is this revisionary metaphysics of minds and their perceived environments really 
acceptable? Might there be good reasons to reject it? Putnam’s Twin Earth is a fanciful 
creation and in that context a fanciful metaphysical response might not seem out of place but 
the unitary interpretation of mind can have some very counterintuitive consequences in the 
context of contemporary cosmology, which takes the existence of parallel worlds as 
physically possible, as the following paragraph explains. 
In a nutshell, standard Big Bang cosmology has it that we inhabit a causally isolated 
region of space which is known as our observable universe. It is isolated because causal 
influence cannot propagate faster than the speed of light in vacuo and the time which has 
elapsed since the Big Bang is finite, so there can be distant objects which have had no causal 
influence on our local environment. Our observable universe has a finite volume and 
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according to quantum mechanics there is a finite number of definite physical states which that 
volume can possibly occupy. Since there is as yet no evidence that space and the number of 
galaxies it contains is finite, it is possible that there exist two or more regions of space which 
are physically type-identical to what we take to be our observable universe and have type-
identical histories. These are spatially separated ‘parallel universes’, Tegmark (2007, p. 104). 
In what follows no simultaneity between parallel universes is presumed. 
Suppose that there do in fact exist many instances of what we take to be our observed 
universe. On the conventional ‘plural interpretation of mind’ you are here in this universe and 
your doppelgangers are far off in the distance, in other regions of space causally isolated from 
our owni. On the alternative unitary interpretation your doppelgangers are not far off, they are 
all right here. The body which you perceive as yours is a set which takes the doppelgangers as 
elements. And any object in your observed environment, such as a green apple, is a set of 
parallel counterpart green apples. This can seem absurd; we start off by hypothesizing parallel 
universes which are far apart and then claim that they are all in the same place! 
The absurdity is only apparent. The unification arises simply because the doppelgangers 
share a physical form, no other connection between them is being posited. Having left Scar 
behind in Putnam’s imaginary setup let us now introduce a new character for the 
cosmologically respectable setup where there exist many isomorphic observable universes of 
any given type. Call her Hydra. Hydra’s body is a set of dopplegangers: {H1, H2, etc.}. And 
Hydra can tell you where she is. Multiphonically, she says ‘I’m 5,205 kilometres from the 
North Pole and 5.37 degrees east of the Greenwich meridian’. Hydra’s North Pole is a set of 
parallel counterpart poles: {p1, p2, etc.}, and her Greenwich meridian is a set of parallel 
counterpart meridians: {m1, m2, etc.}. The distances H1 to p1, H2 to p2, etc., are all 5,205 
kilometres and the angles H1 to m1, H2 to m2, etc., are all 5.37 degrees. According to the rule I 
introduced earlier, Hydra has the property of being 5,205 kilometres from her North Pole if 
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and only if each of the pairs of objects (H1, p1), (H2, p2), etc. have the property of being 5,205 
kilometres apart. They do, so she does. 
Likewise, Hydra can be taken to speak truly about her longitude. And a similar exercise 
with events and clocks allows her to be understood to speak truly about times, recalling the no 
simultaneity between parallel universes is being assumed. So the idea that there exists a 
multitude of parallel universes which are spatiotemporally separated is not at odds with the 
idea that your mind spans all of them in a perceived here and now because a perceived 
spatiotemporal region is to be interpreted as a set of parallel counterpart spatiotemporal 
regions. 
But there is another reason why the unitary interpretation of mind can seem absurd. We 
attribute mental content to creatures in an attempt to explain their behaviours. If Hydra 
believes that an apple is crisp and juicy and so desires to munch it, that explains why she 
eagerly plucks it. But it seems obvious that we can explain the behaviour of each of the 
doppelgangers in exactly the same way. So the conventional plural interpretation of mind 
must be right after all. In each parallel universe the causal relation between the doppelganger 
and the apple is local, so the behaviour must be locally explained. 
This brings us to the deep issue of the nature of causality. In everyday life we take 
causation to be a relation of natural necessitation. The red billiard ball moves thus and so 
because struck by a cue ball. David Hume is often taken to have shown that the very idea of  
natural necessitation is incoherent, though Galen Strawson has argued that Hume believed 
that there is indeed a ‘secret connexion’ between events, albeit as yet of an unfathomable 
nature (1989). Let us suppose to begin with that a real causal relation may exist between the 
impact of the cue ball and the rebound of the red ball. I shall consider afterwards the 
alternative ‘regularity’ view of causation which is often attributed to Hume. 
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Hydra’s cue ball strikes the red. Her cue ball is a set of balls, as is the red. In each 
parallel world there is a cue ball and a red ball each of which is a Quine atom, a self-
membered singleton set. If, somehow-we-know-not-how, there is a relation of natural 
necessitation between the striking and rebounding balls then it is a relation between sets. But 
then there is no reason to suppose that there is not a relation of natural necessitation between 
Hydra’s striking and rebounding balls, which are also sets. So we can explain Hydra’s 
behaviour by attributing mental contents to her just as easily as we can explain the behaviours 
of her doppelgangers if they are regarded as the bodies of distinct subjects. So the concept of 
causation as a relation of natural necessitation only presents a difficulty for the unitary 
interpretation of mind if that relation is taken just to exist between individuals which are non-
sets. But then some principled objection is needed to Quine’s suggestion that individuals can 
be interpreted as self-membered singletons. 
Now consider causality as constant conjunction. On that view, to say that the striking of 
the cue ball causes the red ball to move thus and so is just to say that similar events have 
always gone like that. Since parallel universes are by hypothesis isomorphic and have 
isomorphic histories a constant conjunction of events in one universe is necessarily a constant 
conjunction of sets of parallel counterpart events. So, again, there is no reason to reject 
attributing mental contents to Hydra to explain her behaviours since here bodily movements 
are sets of parallel counterpart bodily movements. If, for whatever reason, the universes 
which Hydra’s mind spans should cease to be parallel in ways which affect her mentality 
then, as we saw with Scar, she will undergo personal fission into distinct people with 
qualitatively distinct minds. Each of those persons’ minds will span a subset of universes 
which have remained parallel. So each of those persons’ histories will be a history of constant 
conjunctions between sets of parallel counterpart events. Whichever of the two views of 
causality is favoured, there is no reason to suppose that conventional plural interpretation of 
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mind is to be preferred to the alternative unitary interpretation, despite intuitions to the 
contrary. 
 
7. Varieties of Divergence 
 
Since we have returned to reality via contemporary cosmology we had better take quantum 
theory into account too, and that seems to create bizarre consequences for the unitary 
interpretation of mind if a multitude of parallel universes exists. Consider standard quantum 
mechanics which takes quantum processes to be stochastic. And suppose that Hydra’s mind 
spans a very large or infinite number of parallel universes. She can make a measurement of 
the spin of a particle relative to some spatial axis, for instance, which quantum mechanics tells 
her has two possible definite outcomes on the ‘pointer basis’ indicated by a pointer which 
moves either left or right. Call these two possible outcomes L and R, with probabilities pL 
and pR. As Hydra makes the measurement a stochastic process takes place in each of the 
parallel universes which her mind spans. In some of the universes the result is L and in some 
it is R. So the original set of universes partitions into two subsets and Hydra fissions into two 
observers, HydraL who sees L and HydraR who sees R. If the sets of universes are infinite then 
the relative measures of the subsets on the original set are pL and pR, the ‘probability 
measures’. If the sets of universes are large but finite the measures will be proportions and 
will approximate to pL and pR, given the Law of Large Numbers.  
According to the conventional plural interpretation of mind, an observer in a single 
universe, prior to making the measurement, speaks truly when s/he says ‘The probability that 
I will see the result R is pR’ because there is an utterance in each universe referring to a 
stochastic process. But when Hydra speaks the sounds coming from the mouths of the many 
doppelgangers do not each voice an utterance. Hydra makes a single utterance which is 
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mulitphonic and her utterance refers to a process of partitioning, not a stochastic process. 
What Hydra refers to as objective quantum-mechanical probabilities are the relative measures 
of the subsets into which the pre-measurement set of universes partitions. 
It is on the issue of probability that Bostrom makes what appears to be a telling point 
against the unitary interpretation of mind, which he calls ‘Unification’ (op.cit.). He imagines 
what he calls a Big World ‘in which all possible human experiences are in fact made’ (ibid., 
p.187). Suppose that in that world the cosmic background temperature is 2.7°K, as chez nous. 
Observers whose evidence derives from a reliable sampling of the world will measure 
approximately 2.7°K. But there will be ‘unlucky’ observers who get an unreliable sampling so 
that they measure, say, 3.1°K. ‘Yet’, as Bostrom puts it, ‘if Unification were true, then 
experiences of observing 3.1°K would be just as frequent as experiences of observing 2.7°K’ 
(ibid.). He goes on to conclude, ‘Thus Unification would undercut a natural account of why 
our experiential evidence enables us to learn about the world (even if the world is a Big 
World).’ (ibid., p. 188). 
This can indeed seem intuitively compelling. However, Bostrom does not take into 
account the constitution of the unified subject’s environment. What is at issue here is the 
probability that a subject making a measurement of some parameter has access to a 
representative sampling of the data. As we saw with Hydra, in an infinite world where there 
are different possible observations with associated probabilities, the post-observation subset 
measures for a fissioning subject just are the probabilities of the various observations in each 
‘branch’ of the partitioning. For a non-infinite Big World corresponding branch measures will 
approximate to the probabilities, given the Law of Large Numbers. If Hydra2.7 observing 
2.7°K thinks she has reliable sampling, she’s right, because she’s on a branch with a high 
probability measure. But if Hydra3.1 thinks she has reliable sampling, she’s wrong, because 
she’s on a low-probability branch. The unitary interpretation of mind is simply a change of 
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perspective. Bostrom’s frequencies still indicate probabilities, given the Law of Large 
Numbers, but in a different way than they do on the conventional plural interpretation of mind 
which he defends. 
There is another consequence of combining cosmological parallel universes, quantum 
mechanics and the unitary interpretation of mind which can appear troubling. Suppose that 
when Hydra initiates her quantum measurement she does not immediately observe the 
outcome because the pointer is facing away from her. However, Hydra’s friend Kaliya who is 
sitting opposite can see the pointer. As the measurement takes place Kaliya fissions into 
KaliyaL and KaliyaR but there is no good reason to suppose that Hydra fissions. To be sure, 
the physical changes in the pointer and in Kaliya will have effects which propagate away from 
them in Hydra’s direction and which will cause some changes in Hydra’s body, but it is 
implausible that those very small changes would change Hydra’s cognitive state, either 
conscious or unconscious. 
The implication is that there can come to be properties of Hydra’s own body which are 
indefinite for her since not all the doppelgangers which are elements of her body are 
physically isomorphic. Also, Kaliya’s cognitive state will cease to be definite relative to 
Hydra since Kaliya has fissioned and Hydra has not. Whilst Hydra remains ignorant of the 
result after the measurement there is not a single person facing her but rather a human body 
which is a set of doppelgangers with subsets constituting the bodies of two people, KaliyaL 
and KaliyaR. Only when those two people tell Hydra the results they see does Hydra fission 
into HydraL and HydraR. 
In a similar vein, consider Jack the Ripper (footnote to be added after blind review). His 
having had a wart on his nose, or not, may well be compatible with your exact cognitive state 
now, both conscious and unconscious. This is an extremely complex matter. Whether or not 
Jack had a wart on his nose will have myriad knock on effects which may influence 
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everything from the New York stock market in 1929 to your local weather as you read this. 
So it is not obviously true that your cognitive state is independent of Jack’s wart, but it might 
be and we are unlikely to ever be sure that it is not. In which case you cannot be sure that your 
mind does not span universes which are only partly parallel, some of them containing in their 
past a doppelganger which was an element of Jack’s body with a wart and some a 
doppelganger without. So you cannot be sure that there is a fact of the matter as to whether 
the person you refer to as Jack the Ripper had a wart on his nose or not. Even if Jack’s body 
has been preserved and lies now in a Welsh bog its wartiness may be indefinite relative to 
you. In which case, if you were to dig it up, you would fission into persons finding and not 
finding a wart. 
I should stress that strange consequences such as this only arise from the unitary 
interpretation of mind if there exist multiple parallel universes of the sort we observe which is 
plausible according to contemporary cosmology but which might not be the case. 
 
8. Parting Lines 
 
I have argued that the unitary interpretation of mind can dissolve the zombie problem and 
undermine Twin Earth arguments for semantic externalism. That leaves us free of two 
significant background worries whilst pursuing a physicalist/materialist cognitive science on 
the assumption that minds are wholly contained in heads, with the possible addition of 
sufficiently well integrated peripherals. There could be strange consequences if we inhabit a 
world of many parallel universes in which stochastic processes take place but I hope to have 
shown that this alternative view of the mind-body relation is worthy of consideration. 
If the idea is indeed acceptable it makes the possibility of personal transport via 
teleportation and survival via mind uploading more plausible. For if the conventional view 
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that minds can be qualitatively identical and numerically distinct is accepted it would seem 
that teleportation and mind uploading can only ever lead to the creation of a person just like 
oneself but numerically distinct; a person who is no more you than is your doppelganger on a 
distant planet. Only if matched neuro-functional structures instance the mentality of one and 
the same person do teleportation and mind uploading appear possible as means of personal 
transport and survival.  
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  i	  Douglas Porpora has argued that such doppelgangers, despite having a finite number of 
possible physical states, may entertain an infinite number of different thoughts. And his 
argument is not that that is so because they make indexical reference to an infinite number of 
numerically distinct environments (2013). A reply is to be found in Curtis (2015). In what 
follows I am assuming that Porpora’s argument fails.	  
